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Abstract
We investigate a linear state di¤erential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duo-
poly with capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality
(pollution), in which one of the rms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR)
in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental e¤ects of
production in its objective function. If the market is su¢ ciently large, the CSR rm sells
more, accumulates more capital and earns higher prots than its prot-seeking rival.
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1 Introduction
Firms embracing a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR, henceforth) regime take into account
not only the shareholder interests (prot), but also how the rm decisions a¤ect the agents
dealing with the rm (stakeholders), such as employees, business partners, consumers and
environment. The presence of CSR is viewed by its supporters as a self-regulating tool, as it
leads rms to internalise the environmental e¤ects caused by production. On the one hand, a
rm may rationally anticipate that environmental regulation will become stricter and therefore
her anticipated concerns may create to her a competitive advantage. Secondly, corporate
managers have environmental preferences or shareholders have and ask managers to follow a
strategy consistent with them. Finally, green consumers penalise rms without environmental
concerns, raising pollution costs and therefore acting as a sort of Pigouvian tax mechanism.
Conversely, who is against CSR argues that a corporations purpose is to maximize returns to
its shareholders, and that since only people can have social responsibilities, corporations are
only responsible to their shareholders and not to society as a whole (Friedman, 1962 and 1970).
The interest on the analysis of CSR is quite recent in the economic literature.1 On the
theoretical side, CSR rms have been analysed from several perspectives.2 One strand identies
CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads (Bagnoli and Watts, 2003,
Kotchen, 2006, Besley and Ghatak, 2010), generally showing that there is a close parallel
between CSR so dened and the results obtained by the models of private provision of public
goods. Other contributes study the desirability of CSR (Baron, 2001), the role of CSR in
selecting motivated agents (Brekke and Nyborg, 2005) or the rm competition in the presence
of green consumers (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995 and Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzís,
2009) or social pressure (Baron, 2009). Finally, Manasakis et al. (2007), Alves and Santos-
Pinto (2008) and Lambertini and Tampieri (2010) examine the strategic e¤ects between CSR
and prot-maximising rms.
All these theoretical approaches to the analysis of the CSR display a specic static setting.
To the best of our knowledge, little has been said about dynamic analysis in the presence of
CSR. Becchetti and Solferino (2005) account for rm interactions in a dynamic setting. They
compute the open-loop Nash equilibrium between duopolists that are di¤erentiated according
to their CSR position along the Hotelling line. Wirl et al. (2013) analyse a dynamic framework
of a rms CSR activities to analyze how a rm should pursue its CSR activities over time, while
taking into account that the relative position with respect to its competitors is an important
determinant for its reputation, and thus long run prot. Even though these contributions
highlight the role of strategic interaction in CSR activities over time, the role of a CSR rm
in a¤ecting and capital accumulation is still to investigate. Our aim with the present analysis
is to ll this gap.
In this paper we investigate a state-linear di¤erential game describing an asymmetric
1For an overview, see Benabou and Tirole (2010).
2On the empirical side, the relatively large research on CSR has mainly focussed on nancial performance,
nding a mixed support to the view that altruistic behaviour is detrimental to prots. See Murray and Volgel
(1997), Mohr et al., (2001), Becchetti and Ciciretti (2009), Fernández-Kranz and Santaló (2010) and Fisher-
Vanden and Thorburn (2011), inter alia. For a comparative analysis among studies on CSR and rmseconomic
performance, see Margolis et al. (2007).
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Cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and a negative environmental ex-
ternality (pollution). The analysis is based on the framework of optimal capital accumulation
in di¤erential games (Kamien and Schwartz, 1979, Reinganum, 1980, Fershtman and Muller,
1984, and Cellini and Lambertini, 1998, inter alia). Competition is asymmetric since one rm
has standard, prot-maximising objectives, whereas its competitor adopts CSR principles in
its statute. We dene as CSRa rm that takes into account not only its prots but also
internalises its own share of the externality and is sensitive to consumerswelfare. Thus the
CSR rm includes a share of consumer surplus and the environmental e¤ects of production in
its objective function (Kopel and Brand, 2012, Lambertini and Tampieri 2010, 2012).
It is noteworthy to compare our framework with the analysis carried out by Wirl et al.
(2013). In their setup:
 Each rm may undertake some CSR activities. Conversely, we consider a interaction
between a prot-maximising(which cannot engage in CSR activities whatsoever) and
a CSRrm.
 CSR activities result in a specic benet that a rm obtains from CSR. In our analysis
a rm engaging in CSR is modelled in a similar way as a public rm: takes into account
other aspects of social welfare such as pollution and (a share of) consumer surplus.
 Firms with similar technology will endeavour in CSR in the same level, resulting in a
symmetric interaction. Conversely, the interaction between a prot-maximising and a
CSR rm leads to an asymmetric equilibrium.
 The environmental e¤ect of production in terms of pollution is not explicitly taken into
account.
 In particular, the analysis of Wirl et al. (2013) is interested on the dynamic of engaging
in CSR activities over time. In the present paper we highlight the evolution of capital
accumulation and pollution.
The results show that the presence of a CSR rm forces the competitor to consider social
concerns, namely, pollution and consumer surplus, in its production decisions. In particular,
the environmental concern restrains the production of a CSR rm, while the concern about
social surplus expands it. The second e¤ect more than o¤sets the rst one in a large market,
because the positive price e¤ect going along with an output expansion is su¢ ciently large to
outweigh the negative e¤ect associated with pollution. As a consequence, with a su¢ ciently
large market, the CSR rm makes higher prots than its prot-seeking rm, and accumulates
more capital. For medium-size markets, the CSR rm earns more prots but accumulates less
capital than the competitor. Finally in small markets, the prot-maximising rm earns more
and accumulates more capital. The paper considers next the technical conditions under which
the steady state equilibrium exists and it is stable.
This paper aims to contribute both on the literature on CSR and on technical aspects
of di¤erential games. First, we propose an explanation on why a rm decides to commit to
CSR principles. In our interpretation, a rm may commit to CSR strategically as this can
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be protable against standard prot maximisation. This occurs as the strategic interaction
of a CSR rm with prot-maximising competitors may lead to higher prots for the former.
On the technical side, the dynamic optimisation problem is non-standard, this due to two
factors of asymmetry. On the one hand, asymmetry emerges since the rms competing in the
duopoly feature di¤erent objectives. Second, asymmetry also a¤ects the number of strategic
variables at hand. Indeed, while the prot-seeking rm chooses its equilibrium quantities only,
the CSR rm also competes by investing in R&D with the aim of abate polluting emission.
The di¤erence is caused by the fact that the prot-seeking rm does not internalise pollution,
whereas investing in greenR&D helps the CSR rm to abate its own cost. In this way, R&D
investment acts as a self-regulating tool.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section
3 shows the steady state equilibrium. Section 4 investigates the conditions under which the
equilibrium is stable. Section 5 concludes. The relevant proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider an industry where two rms, 1 and 2, compete in quantities. The game unravels
over continuous time t 2 [0;1). Firms share the same time preferences measured by the
discount rate  > 0. At any t, rms sell a homogeneous good whose demand function is
p (t) = a  q1 (t)  q2 (t), a > 0; marginal production cost c 2 (0; a) is constant and symmetric
across rms. Each rm uses a production function yi (t) = Aki (t), and accumulates productive
capacity ki (t) to supply its good, with

ki = Aki (t)  qi (t)  ki (t) ; (1)
as in Ramsey (1928), i.e., capacity accumulates via unsold output;  > 0 is the decay rate of
capital. Firm 1 is a CSR agent, while Firm 2 is a pure prot-seeking unit. Additionally, Firm
1 also activates R&D e¤orts x1 (t) to reduce polluting emissions S (t), whose evolution follows
the state dynamics

S =  (q1 (t) + q2 (t))  S (t)  x1 (t) ; (2)
where ;  and  are positive constants. The instantaneous R&D cost is quadratic in the e¤ort,
so that at any t the CSR rms prot function is
1 (t) = [p (t)  c] q1 (t)  zx21 (t) ; (3)
with z > 0.
CSR companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations.
Within the rm, socially responsible behaviours mainly involve employees and relate to issues
such as investing in human capital, health and safety, and managing change, while environ-
mentally responsible behaviours relate to the management of natural resources used in the
production. Out of the company, CSR behaviours involve a wide range of stakeholders, such
as business partners and suppliers, customers, public authorities and local communities.
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Hence we assume a specic CSR objective structure (Lambertini and Tampieri, 2010 and
2012): for the environmental concern, we suppose that the CSR rm internalises its own share
of pollution. This assumption follows by the fact that a rm can inuence directly only its own
production system, and nothing can be done directly to inuence the competitorsbehaviour.
It seems natural to interpret all the other social concerns as a share of consumer surplus (Kopel
and Brand, 2012). Thus the objective attributed to the CSR rm is

1 (t) = 1 (t)  bS (t) + CS (t) ; (4)
with b 2 [0; 1] representing the CSR sensitivity to pollution, CS (t) = (q1 (t) + q2 (t))2 =2 being
instantaneous consumer surplus and  2 [0; 1] being the CSR sensitivity to it. The CSR rms
maximisation problem is:
max
q1(t)0;x1(t)0
J1 =
Z 1
0
e t
"
(a  q1 (t)  q2 (t)  c) q1 (t)  zx21 (t)  bS (t) + 
(q1 (t) + q2 (t))
2
2
#
dt:
On the other hand, rm 2 aims at maximising 2 (t) = [p (t)  c] q2 (t), thus its maximisation
scheme is
max
q2(t)0
J2 =
Z 1
0
e t [(a  q1 (t)  q2 (t)  c) q2 (t)] dt:
Note that rm 2s R&D cost is not taken into account because a prot-seeking rm does not
internalise the pollution e¤ect, then an investment to reduce pollution would be useless and
costly. This leads to a non-standard dynamic optimisation problem where asymmetry also
a¤ects the number of strategic variables at hand (rm 1 has 2 control variables, rm 2 has only
one control variable).
Finally, the instantaneous social welfare is
SW (t) = 1 (t) + 2 (t) + CS (t)  S (t) :
3 Steady state analysis
For convenience throughout the results we denote the market size as m = a c:We are going to
investigate open-loop information structure of the model by relying on Pontryagins Maximum
Principle. The rmsHamiltonians are (omitting the time argument for brevity):
H1(q1; q2; x1; k1; k2; S; 11; 12) = e t


1 + 11

k1 + 12

S

H2(q1; q2; x1; k1; k2; S; 21; 22) = e t

2 + 21

k2 + 22

S
 (5)
where ij is the costate variable attached by player i to state j for i; j = 1; 2. As it appears
from (5), the game is a linear state one, and therefore its open-loop Nash solution is strongly
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time consistent (or equivalently, subgame perfect).3
The necessary conditions for maximisation are
@H1
@q1
= m  q1 (2  )  q2 (1  )  11 + 12 = 0; (6)
@H1
@x1
=  2zx1   12 = 0; (7)
as far as the CSR rm is concerned, and
@H2
@q2
= m  q1   2q2   21 + 22 = 0: (8)
is the rst order condition for the prot-maximising rm.
The system of costate equations reads as8>>>>><>>>>>:

11 = (+   A)11

12 = (+ )12 + b

21 = (+   A)21

22 = (+ )22
(9)
The shadow prices of productive capacities are
11 (t) = 11(0)e
(+ A)t; 21 (t) = 21(0)e
(+ A)t;
whereas the shadow prices of pollution are
12 (t) =
[(+ )12 (0) + b] e
(+)t   b
+ 
; 22 (t) = 22 (0) e
(+)t:
Note that the related transversality conditions may hold under di¤erent circumstances: either
if 11(t), 

21(t), 

22(t) are identically zero or when the relations
lim
t !+1 e
 ti1(t)k

i (t) = 0; lim
t !+1 e
 ti2(t)S
(t) = 0; (10)
hold. If the prot-seeking rm does not take into account the accumulation of the pollution
stock from the beginning of the game, it is intuitive to consider that such costate is identically
zero, i.e., 22 (0) = 0, which also satises the related transversality condition. Hence, we
can eliminate such costate from the dynamic structure, and remain with 3 costate variables
only. A complete discussion on the transversality conditions will be provided in Section 4,
when calculating the optimal state trajectories and characterizing the dynamic structure of
the equilibrium of the model.
Plugging such optimal state variables into (8), solving (6), (7) and (8) for the costate
3For an exhaustive overview of linear state games and the strong time consistency property of open-loop
strategies, see Mehlmann (1988), Dockner et al. (2000) and Cellini et al. (2005), inter alia.
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variables and di¤erentiating with respect to time yields:

q1 =
4z
v [A+    ]x1 (t)  2b  (A     ) [q1 (t) (3  )  (1 + )m]
3   ; (11)

q2 =
( +  A) [(   1)m+ q2 (t) (3  )] + 2z
v
[A+    ]x1 (t)  b
  + 3 ; (12)

x1 = ( + )x1 (t)  b
2z
: (13)
Such expressions are helpful to determine the unique steady state of the system (uniqueness
is ensured by the linearity of the system, whereas the conditions for its existence and sta-
bility are outlined in Section 4), together with (1), for i = 1; 2, and (2). Calling P ss =
(qss1 ; q
ss
2 ; x
ss
1 ; k
ss
1 ; k
ss
2 ; S
ss) the steady state in the control-space set, we will obtain the follow-
ing coordinates:
qss1 =
1
3  

( + 1)m  2b
+ 

;
qss2 =
1
3  

(1  )m+ b
+ 

;
xss1 =
b
2(+ )z
;
kss1 =
1
(3  )(A  )

( + 1)m  2b
+ 

;
kss2 =
1
(3  )(A  )

(1  )m+ b
+ 

;
Sss =
4zm(+ ) + b(   3)2   2b2z
2(3  )z(+ ) :
Note that, provided  2 [0; 1] and A >  (see Propositions 4 and 5), we can enunciate the
suitable conditions on parameters to ensure feasibility of P ss.
Proposition 1. If
m > max

2b
( + 1)(+ )
;
b[(3  )2 + 22z]
4z(+ )

(14)
then all the coordinates of P ss are positive, hence it is feasible.
Proof. See Appendix.
Relying on the expression of P ss, a few considerations can be summarised as follows.
Proposition 2. In steady state, the adoption of a CSR mandate by a rm induces the rival
(i) to account for the e¤ect of production on the environment and consumer surplus.
(ii) to increase its output with the size of environmental impact of production.
(iii) to reduce its output with the share of consumer surplus.
7
Proposition 2 deserves few comments. The fact that the CSR rm takes into account
pollution and consumer surplus in its maximisation problem has two e¤ects on the behaviour
of its prot-maximising competitor. On the one hand, the sensitivity to pollution induces
the CSR rm to restrain its output. In turn the prot-maximising rm strategically increase
its production. An opposite e¤ect comes from consumer surplus. The idea that CSR rms
account for consumer surplus is very closely related to the literature on strategic delegation
and sales targets for managers in oligopolies (Vickers, 1985 and Fershtman and Judd, 1987).
Essentially, rms have incentives to commit to put a greater weight on output in an oligopoly
so as to induce rivals to reduce their output. In the light of this literature, the reason for why
prots can be higher for a CSR rm is that committing to being a CSR rm can be one way
of strategically committing to higher output.
Of course, capital accumulation in steady state depends on the levels of output. Comparing
the levels of capital accumulated in steady state yields:
kss1   kss2 =
2m( + )  3b
(3  )(A  )( + ) > 0;
for
m > em  3b
2 ( + )
:
From Proposition 2 we can derive and confront the steady state prots. Plugging qss1 and x
ss
1
into 1 and qss2 into 2 and comparing 1 and 2 yields:
1   2 =
4b(5   3)zm( + ) + 8(1  )zm2( + )2   b2 (3  )2v2 + 122z
4(3  )2z( + )2 > 0
for
m > bm  b(3  5)z( + ) +pb2(   3)2z( + )2 (2z   2(   1)v2)
4(1  )z( + )2 (15)
Finally, note that bm  em =
b(3  )
h
z  pz (2z + 2(1  )v2)i
4(1  )z( + ) > 0; (16)
for ; z; v > 0;  2 [0; 1] : The ongoing discussion can be summarised as follows
Proposition 3. For (i) m > bm, the CSR rm accumulates more capital and obtains higher
prots than its prot-maximising competitor.
(ii) bm > m > em, the CSR rm accumulates more capital and obtains lower prots than its
prot-maximising competitor.
(iii) em > m, the CSR rm accumulates less capital and obtains lower prots than its
prot-maximising competitor.
Proposition 3 shows that market size plays an important role in determining the level of
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prots and capital accumulation according to the type of rm. A CSR performs better in the
presence of large markets. The intuition behind this result is the following. The presence of
consumer surplus in the CSR objective function increases the output compared to its com-
petitor, while taking into account pollution has an opposite e¤ect. The rst e¤ect more than
o¤set the second e¤ect for large markets, due to consumer surplus being a quadratic function
of output. This in turn a¤ects prots and capital accumulation.
4 Stability of equilibrium
In order to discuss the dynamic structure of the game, we are going to show its state-costate
dynamic system. (7) implies
x1(t) =  

2z
12(t) =  


[(+ )12 (0) + b] e
(+)t   b
2(+ )z
; (17)
whereas the expressions for q1(t) and q

2(t) involving the costate variables can be derived from
(6) and (8), in particular:4
q1(t) =
1
   3 [ m( + 1) + 2

11(t)  212(t) + (   1)21(t)  (   1)22(t)] ; (18)
q2(t) =
1
   3 [m(   1)  

11(t) + 

12(t)  (   2)(21(t)  22(t)] : (19)
By plugging (17), (18) and (19) into the kinematic equations (1) for i = 1; 2, and (2) and
setting 22(t)  0, we achieve the 6 ODE state-costate dynamic system:8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
_k1(t) = (A  )k1 (t) 
1
   3 [ m( + 1) + 2

11(t)  212(t) + (   1)21(t)]
_k2 = (A  )k2 (t) 
1
   3 [m(   1)  

11(t) + 

12(t)  (   2)21(t)]
_S(t) =  S (t) + 
   3 [ 2m+ 

11(t) + 

21(t)] +

2
2z
  
2
   3

12(t)
_

11(t) = (+   A)11(t)
_

12(t) = (+ )

12(t) + b
_

21(t) = (+   A)21(t)
(20)
The following propositions show the optimal productive capacities and the optimal pollu-
4We are going to omit most calculations to lighten the discussion. All calculations are available from the
authors upon request.
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tion stock, respectively, alongside with the related conditions under which the transversality
conditions hold.
Proposition 4. If A > max

+  + ;
+ 2
2

and the following relations are satised:
m( + 1) + 2b
A   +
211(0) + (   1)21(0)
+ 2   2A  
2[(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ )(+   A+ ) = 0; (21)
 m(   1) + b
A    
11(0) + (   2)21(0)
+ 2   2A +
[(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ )(+   A+ ) = 0; (22)
then the transversality conditions (10) hold when the optimal costates 11(t), 

12(t) and 

21(t)
are not identically zero and the optimal productive capacities are given by:
k1(t) =
1
   3

m( + 1) + 2b
  A  
211(0) + (   1)21(0)
+ 2   2A e
(+ A)t +
2[(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ )(+   A+ )e
(+)t

+
+

k1(0) +
1
   3

m( + 1)
A   +
211(0) + (   1)21(0)
+ 2   2A  
2[(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ )(+   A+ ) +
2b
A  

e(A )t;
(23)
k2(t) =
1
   3

m(   1) + b
  A +
11(0) + (   2)21(0)
+ 2   2A e
(+ A)t   [(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ )(+   A+ )e
(+)t

+
+

k2(0) +
1
   3

 m(   1)
A    
11(0) + (   2)21(0)
+ 2   2A +
[(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ )(+   A+ )  
b
A  

e(A )t;
(24)
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5. The optimal pollution stock is given by:
S(t) =
 2m
(   3) b

2
2z
  
2
   3

(+ )12(0) + b
(+ )
+

2
2z
  
2
   3

[(+ )12(0) + b] e
(+)t
(+ 2)(+ )
+
+
(11(0) + 21(0))e
(+ A)t
(   3)(+  +   A) +

S(0) 

2
2z
  
2
   3

[(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ 2)(+ )
+
+
2m
(   3)  
(11(0) + 21(0))
   3  
b
(+ )

2
2z
  
2
   3

e t; (25)
hence the related transversality condition is veried if  < A and if the shadow price 12(t) is
constant, i.e. 12(t) =  
b
+ 
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that condition  < A also holds under the assumptions of Proposition 3. The above
results clarify the characteristics of the shadow prices of the stock of pollution from the stand-
point of the industrial strategies: the prot-maximizing rm attaches no price to the pollution
dynamics, whereas the CSR rm attributes a negative constant shadow price to it. Such
outcome is standard in di¤erential games involving a pollution stock: by construction, if the
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externality enters the payo¤ functions with a negative e¤ect, its shadow price turns out to be
negative.
Because the costate variable 12(t) is constant at equilibrium by Proposition 4, we can
reduce the dynamic system by one equation and obtain a 6-ODE dynamic system, whose
Jacobian matrix of does not need to be evaluated at any steady state because all involved
equations are linear:
J =
266666666666666664
A   0 0 a1 a2
0 A   0 b1 b2
0 0   c1 c2
0 0 0 +   A 0
0 0 0 0 +   A
377777777777777775
; (26)
where aj , bj , j = 1; 2, are the constant coe¢ cients contained in (20), in particular a1 =   2
   3 ,
a2 =     1
   3 , b1 =
1
   3 , b2 =
   2
   3 , c1 =

   3 , c2 =

   3 . Such Jacobian matrix is upper
triangular, hence it is particularly simple to determine its eigenvalues The spectrum of J turns
out to be (J) = fA  ;  ; +    Ag, where   is a negative eigenvalue having algebraic
multiplicity 1, + A is negative too, having multiplicity 2, and the positive eigenvalue A 
has algebraic multiplicity 2, resulting in a 3-dimension stable manifold and a 2-dimension
unstable manifold.
5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated a state-linear di¤erential game describing an asymmetric, duopoly with
quantity competition, capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and polluting production. Compared
to some recent contribution on the analysis of CSR in a dynamic setting, focussing on the
dynamic of CSR e¤ort (Wirl et al., 2013), in this paper we have examined the evolution of
capital accumulation in the comparison between a CSR and a prot-maximising rm. We nd
that, with a su¢ ciently large market, the CSR rm makes higher prots than its prot-seeking
rm, and accumulates more capital. For medium-size markets, the CSR rm earns more prots
but accumulates less capital than the competitor. In small markets, the prot-maximising rm
earns more and accumulates more capital.
Although our analysis does not dwell upon a mixed oligopoly setting, some similarities
between a public and a CSR rm may emerge, since we dened a CSR rms objective function
as a share of social welfare, loosely speaking. After the seminal paper due to Merrill and
Schneider (1966), the literature on mixed oligopoly started developing only in the eighties.5
5See De Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a survey.
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De Fraja and Delbono (1989) showed that, if a public rm may wish to maximise industry
welfare, its pursuit of this objective in interaction with private prot maximising rm will lead
to obtain a greater prot than that obtained by its otherwise identical private competitors.
Cremer et al. (1989) suggest that to nationalise a single existing rm can be socially optimal if
there are no other public rms in the industry, in some cases, nationalising the whole industry
might be best, although unrealistic. De Fraja (1991) shows that the presence of a public rm
in an oligopoly may improve the overall e¢ ciency of the industry. This occurs as the low prices
set by the public producer forces the private rms to cut their costs to match their prices.
This e¤ect is obtained even if the public rm has a certain grade of ine¢ ciency compared
to the private rm. Most recently, Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) elaborate this latest
approach by endogenising production costs through cost-reducing activities. They show that
the private rm cost becomes lower than the public rm cost because the former engages in
excessive strategic cost-reducing activities.
All these contributions are however developed in a static setting. Conversely, the literature
on dynamic mixed oligopoly is scarce. In a recent paper, Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat
(2006) analyse a dynamic mixed duopoly in which a prot-maximizing competitor interacts
with a competitor that prices at marginal cost, with the cumulation of output a¤ecting their
relative positions over time. Their idea is to model the interactions between Linux, an open
source operating system, and Microsofts Windows and consequently emphasizes demand-side
learning e¤ects that generate dynamic scale economies. Our setting may indeed be extended
by considering di¤erent cost technologies among competitors as a further factor of asymmetry.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The coordinate xss1 is positive irrespective of all parameter values. If  < 1, q
ss
2 is positive. If
we assume that A > , kss2 is positive too. The condition
m >
2b
( + 1)(+ )
(27)
ensures the feasibility of qss1 and k
ss
1 , whereas
m >
b[(3  )2 + 22z]
4z(+ )
(28)
ensures the feasibility of Sss.
Proof of Proposition 4
Plugging the optimal costates into the 2 kinematic equations of k1(t) and k

2(t) and solving
them yields the solutions (23) and (24). Consequently, substituting them in the transversality
conditions (10) leads to the following limits:
lim
t !+111(0)

1
   3

m( + 1) + 2b
  A e
( A)t   211(0) + (   1)21(0)
+ 2   2A e
(+2 2A)t+
+
2[(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ )(+   A+ )e
(++ A)t

+ k1(0)+
+
1
   3

m( + 1)
A   +
211(0) + (   1)21(0)
+ 2   2A  
2[(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ )(+   A+ ) +
2b
A  

= 0;
(29)
lim
t !+121(0)

1
   3

m(   1) + b
  A e
( A)t +
11(0) + (   2)21(0)
+ 2   2A e
(+2 2A)t
  [(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ )(+   A+ )e
(++ A)t

+ k2(0)+
+
1
   3

 m(   1)
A    
11(0) + (   2)21(0)
+ 2   2A +
[(+ )12(0) + b]
(+ )(+   A+ )  
b
A  

= 0;
(30)
which hold for all 11(0) and 21(0) when A satises the condition A > max

 + ;
+ 2
2

and when identities (21) and (22) are veried.
Proof of Proposition 5
By plugging the optimal costates 11(t), 

12(t), 

21(t) into the dynamics of pollution, we can
calculate (25). When replacing such expression in the transversality condition involving S(t),
some contributions of the product are exponential functions with positive exponents, hence
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we can only consider a constant shadow price of pollution to ensure that the transversality
condition holds. In particular, if 12(t) =  b= (+ ) for all t 2 [0; +1), it boils down to:
lim
t !+1

  b
+ 


  2m
(   3)e
 t +
(11(0) + 21(0))e
( A)t
(   3)(+  +   A) +

S(0) +
2m
(   3)
 (11(0) + 21(0))
   3  
b
(+ )

2
2z
  
2
   3

e (+)t

;
which vanishes if  < A.
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